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*RESUBMIT ELD-025      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
Formerly CLD-074 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3658 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL EUGENE BOONE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN RONNIE HOLT, U.S.P. Canaan 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-01531) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect 
and for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 12, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 24, 2013 ) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Appellant Michael Eugene Boone is an inmate confined at the United States 
Penitentiary at Canaan (“USP-Canaan”) in Waymart, Pennsylvania.  After a hearing 
before the Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”), Boone was found guilty of a Code 113 
violation, Possession of Any Narcotics Not Prescribed for the Individual by Medical 
Staff.  The DHO sanctioned Boone with forfeiture of 1,000 days of good conduct time, 
sixty days of disciplinary segregation, three years loss of visiting privileges followed by 
three years of restricted visiting, one year loss of commissary privileges, thirty days 
impounding of personal property (excluding religious and legal materials), and two years 
loss of telephone and email privileges.  Boone’s administrative appeals were 
unsuccessful. 
 In 2011, Boone filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  He claimed 
that the evidence used to determine his guilt was insufficient, and that he was denied due 
process at the disciplinary hearing because the confidential informants relied upon by the 
DHO did not have an established history of reliability.  He sought assorted relief, 
including restoration of his good conduct time and prison job, removal of sanctions, and 
removal of the incident report from his record.  The Respondent responded to the 
petition, to which Boone filed a reply.  After reviewing the parties’ submissions, 
including in camera review of documents submitted by the Respondent under seal, the 
District Court denied the habeas petition. 
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 This appeal followed.
1
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).  We review the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief de 
novo, but we review factual findings for clear error.  See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 
310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good time credits.  Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1); Vega, 493 F.3d 
at 317 n.4.  Thus, when an inmate’s disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good 
time credits, the inmate must receive:  (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary 
charges; (2) an opportunity to summon witnesses and present documentary evidence; and 
(3) the factfinder’s written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the 
disciplinary action.  See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff, 
418 U.S. at 563-67).  The disciplinary decision must be supported by “some evidence” in 
the record.  See id. at 455. 
 There appears to be no dispute that Boone received the required notice of charges, 
the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence, and the factfinder’s statement, as 
described above.  Boone’s arguments focused instead on the sufficiency of evidence, and 
on the DHO’s reliance on a confidential informant whose reliability had not been 
established.  When a disciplinary decision relies upon statements from confidential 
                                              
1
 The appeal initially appeared to be untimely.  On our remand, the District Court granted 
relief on Boone’s motion to reopen the time for appeal.  See Federal Rule of Appellate 
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informants, minimum due process requires that the record contain (1) some underlying 
factual information from which the tribunal can reasonably conclude that the informant 
was credible or his information reliable; and (2) the informant’s statement in factual 
language, establishing by its specificity that the informant spoke with personal 
knowledge of the matters.  See Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 502 (3d Cir. 1981), rev’d 
on other grounds, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).  Under Helms, “the record” 
includes both the evidence presented during the disciplinary hearing and the investigative 
report.  See Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 Upon our in camera review of the record, we concur with the District Court’s 
denial of Boone’s habeas petition.  At the outset, we note that the DHO’s findings did not 
rest solely upon a confidential informant statement  Rather, the DHO’s decision relied 
upon corroborating statements of other inmates in a Special Investigative Services 
(“SIS”) investigation report, specifically naming Boone’s involvement in distributing 
heroin at USP-Canaan.  See Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(noting that corroborating testimony can establish the reliability of confidential informant 
testimony).  Each inmate’s statement provided factual specifics conveying personal 
knowledge of Boone’s heroin distribution activity at USP-Canaan.  Thus, we conclude 
that Boone received the minimum due process required under Helms, and that the DHO’s 
decision meets the “some evidence” standard of support.  See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56 
                                                                                                                                                  
Procedure 4(a)(6); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 223-24 
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(we review whether there is “any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion 
reached by the disciplinary board”). 
 For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
(3d Cir. 2007) (discussing “separate document” requirement and entry of judgment). 
